. TItis paper begins with a brief summary of these surveys and then focuses on the overall likelihood that a dramatic reduction in the emissions of greenhouse gases can be achieved by way of reductions in fossil fuel consumption. We shall see that there is great potential for the latter, but that there are also severe limits on the scope for achieving this potential.
R isks of rapid Co,-induced planetary warming have been among the most prominent of the rising concerns over global biospheric change. Many detailed surveys have extensively reviewed the past record of man-made emissions and steadily increasing atmospheric concentrations of the gas and have discussed the probabilities and consequences of ensuing climatic change (National Research Council, 1982 and Clark, 1982; US Environmental Protection Agency, 1983 Smil, 1985; US Department of Energy, 1985; Bolin et ai, 1986; Trabalka and Reichle, 1986; Abrahamson, 1989; Schneider, 1989) . TItis paper begins with a brief summary of these surveys and then focuses on the overall likelihood that a dramatic reduction in the emissions of greenhouse gases can be achieved by way of reductions in fossil fuel consumption. We shall see that there is great potential for the latter, but that there are also severe limits on the scope for achieving this potential.
Facts and Conjectures
We know with sufficient confidence that tropospheric concentrations of CO, have risen from their pre-industrial lcvel (determined from air bubbles trapped in polar ice) of about 280 parts (Fig. 1 ). But we are much less clear about the make-up of anthropogenic emissions responSible for these increases. The rates of current Co, generation from burning of fossil fuels can be calculated fairly accurately.' Annual releases during the late 1980s were nearly 20 billion tonnes (t), while releases due to natural gas flaring, cement production and combustion of wastes totalled less than 2 billion t/yr. But there is considerable uncertainty about the net annual CO, emissions from tropical deforestation and conversion of forests, grasslands and wetlands to fields. Recent estimates put these emissions at anywhere from 2 billion to 9 billion tof CO 2 (Smil, 1985; Trabalka and Reichle, 1986) . Such a large range in estimates is attributable to the large variability of carbon content in plants and our poor knowledge of actual conversion rates. ' The best available historic data (summarized 96 in Clark, 1982) translate into roughly 700 billion tonnes of cumulative emissions from fossil fuels in the period 1850-1990, while Co, releases from ecosystem changes caused by pioneer agriculture and deforestation total close to 600 billion t for the same period. Although these two cumulative totals are surprisingly similar, combustion of fossil fuels is now undoubtedly by far the more important source of anthropogenic CO,. But atmospheric concentrations of other greenhouse gases have also been increasing rapidly: methane concentration roughly doubled during the industrial era and levels of the principal chlorofluorocarbons have nearly doubled since their first measurement in 1977. The atmospheric concentration of these gases is only a small fraction of the C02 level, but since they are stronger absorbers of longwave radiation they are responsible for roughly one-half (US Environmental Protection Agency, 1989) of the overall absorption of outgoing longwave terrestrial radiation.' Still, combustion of fossil fuels remains the single largest source of anthropogenic 1/ Release of CO2 during fuel combustion is a matter of complete oxidation of carbon. Coal has higher CO2 emissions per unit of liberated energy than oils and natural gases, whose hydrogen contributes to energy release when its oxidation yields water. I have been using the following average conversion factors (all rates in grams of carbon per GJ): 24.2 for standard coal, 19.1 for liquid fuels, and 14.3 for natural gases (for a detailed justification of these values see Smil (1985) ). The US Department of Energy uses very similar conversion rates of 23.8,19.2 and 13.7 g C/GJ (Cheng et all 1986) . Global and national fossil fuel combustion totals are available in annual statistical compendia published by the United Nations, British Petroleum and the GA. Inẽ vitable errors arising largely from conversion of nm-ofmine coal to standard fuel equivalen t (an especially imprecise task in the case of the huge Chinese output originating in small rural mines) introduce uncertainty of about ±5%.
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2/ Not surprisingly, the largest discrepancies are found among.th~estimates of tropical deforestation (Myers, 1980; Houghton, 1986) . LANDSAT and SPOT satellite images help to make rough estimates but reliable totals can be assembled only by on-site inspection.
3/ Compared to 350 ppm of CO 2 , the current atmospheric concentrations of other important greenhouse gases are two to five orders of magnitude lower: less than 2 ppm for CH 4l just over 300 ppb for N 2 0, and less than 500 ppt for CFCl, (Bodhaine, 1988) .
greenhouse gases and its reduction would have to be a critical part of any effective strategy to control overall emissions. How soon these efforts should start and how vigorous they should be remains a complex matter of conjecture. One extreme opinion is that worrisome planetary warming induced by greenhouse gases is already happening; at the other extreme it is argued that any such future changes should be seen largely as a matter of overall biospheric and economic gains rather than one of feared losses.' In between is the bulk of the current scientific consensus, resting on a mixture of reliable atmospheric physics, uncertain palaeoclimatic analogies, and still very simplistic and hence dubious simulations of global climate. This view starts with the prediction that the doubling of pre-industrial COz (i.e., a COz concentration of 600 ppm, or its equivalent as a mixture of CO, plus the other greenhouse gases) will raise tropospheric temperatures by anywhere from I-5°C.
More specifically, it is predicted that this warming should be about two to three times more pronounced in higher latitudes than in the tropics and greater in the Arctic than in the Antarctic. It should intensify the global water cycle (manifested by higher circumpolar runoffs, later snowfalls and earlier snowmelts), which should be accompanied by a major redistribution of worldwide precipitation patterns, an intensification of extreme weather conditions (tropical and temperate cyclones, droughts), shifts in ecosystem boundaries (northward march of grasslands and forests), a poleward retreat of sea ice, and an appreciable rise in sea level (causing coastal inundation, greater erosion and storm damage and salt water intrusion). (See references cited in the opening paragraph.)
Complexities surrounding the genesis, identification, progression and effects of global warming have no simple, indisputable resolution. This guarantees that the coming decades will see a continuing clash of opinions regarding the existence and extent of the process and its effects. While it would be inadvisable to accept uncritically many untested claims about the dangers of future wanning, a prudent risk-minimizing attitude requires that we start assembling and assessing effective strategies which would moderate the negative impacts of such a global change.
An essential ingredient of these efforts would be a substantial reduction in emissions of greenhouse gases. This would be impossible without reducing the global consumption of fossil fuels. The substitution of alternative energy sourcesrenewable energy conversions and nuclear electricity -will certainly contribute to these reductions. However, since a critical examination of the post-1973 record shows that long-range predictions of technical innovation are futile (Smil, 1987 ), I will not extend the list of embarrassing forecasts by offering estimates of global penetration rates for the alternative energy techniques that appear most promising for the coming two to four decades. (These are large-scale photovoltaics (Hubbard, 1989) and the second generation of nuclear systems.)
In any case, the well-documented slow pace of primary resource substitu tions (Marchetti and Nakicenovic, 1979) , the mismatch between the low power density of renewable conversions and the high power density of urban and industrial needs (Smil, 1985) , and the massive postChernobyl distrust of nuclear generation, mean that alternative energies will not be able to take over more than a small fraction (most likely less than 10%) of the current global fossil fuel flow within the next 20 years. The need for relatively rapid reductions of CO" resulting from early confirmation of an unmistakable warming signal, would have to be met largely by energy conservation. The latter has a huge potential for impressive achievements, but also a multitude of limitations restricting its short and mediumterm gains. 
Potential for Reduced Fossil Fuel Consumption
Although I agree with Rose (I986) that the tenn "rational and effective energy use" is preferable to "conservation", I will sweep all appropriate approaches under that imprecise but cornmonly used cover, the opportunities and benefits of which have been extolled in so many post-1973 publications (Ford et ai, 1975; Lovins, 1977; Socolow, 1977; Gibbons and Chandler, 1981; Hu, 1983; Rose, 1986) . These opportunities may be divided into a trio of broad strategies: doing without; maximizing conversion efficiencies; and reducing the use of energy-intensive products through better design and extensive recycling of materials.
Doing without is a much under-appreciated option in affluent societies which are habituated to the idea of growth. Its impact is obvious when one compares per capita energy use in the Western world of the early 1960s (a time chosen to allow the damages of World War II to be healed) with that of the late 1980s: was life with 10% (the US case), 30% (in Canada or West Gennany) or even 40% less energy (nearly that much in France) so unbearable?
The potential for better conversion efficiencies -achieved directly by improving the performance of combustors and prime movers, or indirectly by adjusting their settings and emissions -remains large in every consumption sector and at every stage of economic development. Given the prevailing make-up of sectoral consumption, the largest savings in the rich world can corne from buildings and transportation.
Buildings
Collectively, buildings are either the largest or second largest consumers of energy (behind all industrial conversions) in all rich societies. Space heating and cooling is the dominant demand in every rich nation (between 50-80% of all residential consumption), followed by lighting and electric appliances and water heating. The potential for efficiency improvements in all of these categories is impressive (Williams and Dull, 1983; 98 Baird et ai, 1984; Schipper et ai, 1985; Rosenfeld and Hafemeister, 1988) .
The average consumption for North American housing stock (in units of kJ/m 2 /degree-day) was about 160 in 1980. New buildings constructed during the 1980s rate between 100 and 120. Superinsulated houses decrease to 30-50 and the most efficient designs can use as little as
15-20 kJ/m
2 /degree-day. Halving the total energy needs is not thus an exceptional performance. Further savings can corne from structural changes. In comparison with the still much-favored three-bedroom single-story house, an equally-sized two-story building is 15%, a twostory duplex 30%, a two-story triplex 35%, and a low-rise condominium apartment 40% more energy-efficient (Burchell and Listokin, 1982) .
Efficiencies of principal household energy convertors differ widely, from just 50% for solidfuelled furnaces to 55-65% for well-adjusted tradi tional oil and gas furnaces with a standing pilot light and up to 91-96% for condensing nonvented gas-fired units (Macriss, 1983 (Fig. 2) . By the mid-1980s the primary energy required by new office buildings was below 50 WI m 2 and many all-electric buildings have been designed for just around, or even below, 10 W1m 2 , or less than 30 W of primary energy per square metre of occupied area.
Lighting can also become much more efficient. The most efficient incandescent light, a 10 kW source for film studios, puts out 33.6lumens/W (lm/W) (Weast, 1989) . Using 1.47 mW11m as the standard mechanical equivalent of light, the 10 kW lamp is less than 5% efficient in converting
Transportation is around 32%. Frictional losses bring this down to 26% and partial load factors, inevitable during the urban driving which constitutes most car travel, reduce it to 19-20%. Losses due to the use of accessories and automatic transmissions may nearly halve the total. Thus, effective efficiency is no more than 10-12%, and can be as low as 7-8% (Reitz, 1985) .
Between 1974 and 1988 mean fuel consumption for the North American car fleet fell by almost 50% to 3.1 MJ/km (Fig. 3) . However, this belated decline still leaves the new mean at over 81/100 km, at a time when there is no shortage of cars that average 6-8 1/100 km, even in city traffic, and when the best performers among gasoline-fuelled vehicles -including the Ford Fiesta, Daihatsu euore or Renault R5 -need just 4.3-4.81/100 km (1.7-1.5 MJ/km) when running at 90 km/h (Adler et ai, 1986) .
As with buildings, major improvements in automotive efficiency require no technical breakthroughs and can come from a combination of gradual adjustments and Widespread applications of existing techniques (Reitz, 1985) . To begin with, cars have been unnecessarily powerful: unless driving requires unusually rapid acceleration, travel on uncommonly steep roads or heavy towing, there is no reason to have any standard passenger cars rated over 35 kW. Even a VW Golf is overrated (40 kW) and the Honda Civic is nearly twice as powerful as necessary (63 kW). Lower weights obviously reduce power requirements: front wheel drive with transversely-mounted engines and replacement of 5teel by lighter materials are the key routes to take.
There remains much scope for reducing aerodynamiC drag on automobiles. Other ingredients of a strategy which could yield national car fleets averaging below 1.75 MJ/km(5 I/l00km)before the end of 20th century are: lean-bum low-friction engines; continuously variable transmissions; and more use of the inherently more efficient diesel engine, espeCially better adiabatic low-friction kinds. This would correspond to drive train efficiencies around 20%.
Air transportation claims an increasing share of refined fuel ou tpu t. Turbofan engines By far the greatest efficiency gains in transportation can come from improving motor vehicles, above all, the performance of passenger cars. In 1985,27% of global oil refinery output was motor gasoline and just over 20% was diesel oil for land vehicles and ships (United Nations, 1987) . Jet fuels accounted for about 3%. Everyday average vehicle performance is very low. The best practical First-Law efficiency of an Otto cycle engine electricity into light, while efficiency of the common 100 W bulb is a mere 2.6%. New techniques have boosted the performance: the standard 40 W warm white fluorescent tube has nearly 12% efficiency and it lasts at least 25 times longer (20,000+ hours) than a 100 W incandescent bulb. The best performers are high-intensity discharge metal halide (up to 110 lm/W) and high-pressure sodium lamps (up to 140 lm/W) whose efficiencies now near or even surpass 20%.
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mounted on wide-bodied jets have already brought major efficiency gains (Sampl and Shank, 1985) and there are further considerable opportunities to continue this commendable trend (Fig. 4) .
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Figure 4: Impressive secular decline of aircraft fuel consumption: turbojets of the late 1950s used about 50% more fuel than will the advanced turbofans and turboprops in the year 2000 (Sampl and Shank, 1985) .
as large as 68% to 85% for motors rated below 1 kW. Even relatively small potential improvements for larger machines (a mere 2% for motors with efficiencies already exceeding 90%) translate into large aggregate gains when multiplied by millions of operating units. New high-efficiency motors are readily available and payback periods for their installation are a mere year or two. Utilization of waste heat offers enormous conservation potential in power plants and industrial enterprises requiring high-temperature steam or dry heat. Cogeneration -the use of a single primary heat source to produce electricity and thermal energy Simultaneously -uses 10-30% less fuel than if electricity and heat were produced in two separate facilities (Clark, 1986) .
Reducing the use of energy-intensive materials is an approach applicable equally well to soft-drink cans and jumbo airliners, but these design improvements yield limited energy savings compared to the recycling of most metals and paper. Ferrous metallurgy is still the largest consumer of fossil fuels among principal material-producing industries and using scrap in steelmaking saves 10-25 MJ/kg compared with the 25-50 MJ/kg used for steel made from ore- 
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Industrial energy conservation since 1973 has been very successful in most GECD countries, with efficiency gains in the use of electricity being most impressive. For example, by 1985 American industries cut their electric intensity (kWh/$GNP) to one-halfof their 1971 rate (Ross, 1989) . But even here the potential savings are far from exhausted, especially in replacing older AC-polyphase induction electric motors rated from 750 W to 100 kW, which are the most important (for pumping, compressors, fans, blowers, machine tools). Potential efficiency gains are derived iron. Typical reductions in recovering nonferrous metals from scrap, as opposed to smelting them from ores, are at least 250 MJ/kg for aluminum, around 50 MJ /kg for copper and zinc and 30 MJ/kg for lead (Wilson, 1979) .
Overall Gains
These examples are sufficient to demonstrate the breadth and the level of possible gains from energy conservation. What the actual combined savings during the next 20-40 years will be is no less conjectural than the forecasts of planetary warming. Rather than adding to a large number of dubious long-term energy forecasts, the potential enormity of future energy savings can be best illustrated by simply observing that, in my view, the 1990 level of final energy services could be provided with up to 25% less primary energy within 20 years. A cut of close to 50% should not be seen as unrealistic within two generations. Indeed, a global study by Brookhaven National Laboratory has concluded that, by the middle of the next century, gains achievable by the use of more efficient energy conversions could add up to 500 EJ, or nearly 60% of the fossil fuel demand in the year 2050 without technical improvements (Cheng et ai, 1986) .
The highly skewed global distribution of fossil fuel combustion would seem to be helpful in bringing about such major gains. Only three countries are responsible for 50% of all CO2from fossil fuel combustion: the USA produces 22%, the USSR 18% and China 10% of the global total. Comparable to the case of strategic arms negotiations, an agreement among the handful of energy-consuming superpowers (adding Japan and West Germany to the group) would not eliminate the global risk -in this case, the accumulation of fossil fuel-derived C02 emissionsbut it could lead to its substantial reduction.
But neither the impressive conservation potential nor the highly concentrated use of fossil fuels are guarantees of speedy and extensive progress: a variety of constraints will reduce the highest possible gains to a fraction of the best technical potential.
Limits to Reductions
The 1980s have been a decade of globally unprecedented consumption -in North America, consumption patterns have been increasingly ostentatious and economically debilitating. Voluntary frugality has clearly been in short supply throughout the rich Western world. Putting much faith into the option of doing without is illusory in the absence of acute social crises, the only time when affluent democracies are inclined to adopt proscriptive measures. What would a string of extraordinarily hot and dry years (which would not, of course, in itself necessarily mark the onset of pronounced long-term global warming) do to the willingness to sacrifice?
Doing with less is a more appealing alternative than doing without. But conservation has an important perceptual problem owing to its contrarian nature: in facing the energy dilemma, it springs from what Socolow (977) appropriately labelled "inverted emphasis." Instead of concentrating all efforts on enlarging energy supplythe traditionally dominant way of development -the inverted approach focuses on deliveries of particular energy needs and inevitably discovers huge rationalization opportunities. Curiously enough, this continues to be viewed too often as much less important than even the most dubious quests for new sources of supply, a reality perfectly illustrated by the respective levels of mass media attention. ' Putting aside these perceptions of irrationality, there are two unavoidable practical limits to conservation. There is no eqUivalent of spectacular giant oilfield discoveries in energy conservation, no dramatic single-item short-cut. Particular conservation efforts -even when obviously so far-reaching as higher efficiency stan-5/ Compare the frenzied coverage of the most recent nonẽ vent associated with energy supply -the story of cold fusion -with a virtual absence of reporting on aeroderivative turbines for stationary electricity generation (Williams and Larson, 1988) . The latter is a fine technical innovation using well-established machines in a new configuration designed to improve substantially the efficiency of thermal electricity production. dards for cars, air conditioners or refrigeratorscannot reduce national energy use by large margins. Only sustained accumulation of numerous improvements can add up to impressive reductions.
Successful conservation efforts thus require prodigious numbers of informed individual decisions and long-term commitment: both can be a problem in many rich Western societies. Higher energy inputs into conservation generate greater life-cycle savings but require longer amortization spans. Such commitments run against both the frequent preference for low initial cost and the still very high mobility of North American society. In many poor countries. . . where average conversion efficiencies are even more dismal than in the rich world, a lack of capital investment often precludes the adoption of even relatively simple measures.
Energy conservation is thus primarily a matter of important socioeconomic adjustments, rather than of technical innovation, and the progress of those changes is almost invariably far behind the engineering potential. But still more important is the fact that even some impossibly large C02 emission cuts by major offenders would translate into just minor reductions of overall growth rates in emissions of greenhouse gases. This is the consequence of a complex mixture of gases and sources contributing to the risk of planetary warming. In 1988 about 57% of the total burden was coming from fossil fuels (overwhelmingly as CO" but also as N,O), 17% from chlorofluorocarbons, 3% from various industrial processes (largely C02), 14% from agricultural activities (as C02, CH, and N20), and 9% from land use changes, mainly CO, from deforestation (US Environmental Protection Agency, 1989) .
Even an immediate (and unquestionably impossible) 30% reduction of C02 emissions in the US would cut global greenhouse emissions by less than 4%. If all rich countries did the same, the total would decline by about 1/10. Furthermore, in the coming decades national contributions to the global total of CO, flux will become less concentrated in a small number of countries. This will occur because of the combination of low population growth rates, major energy conservation gains and near-saturated per capita demand in the rich countries on the one hand, with high natalities, persistent gross energy conversion inefficiencies and huge unfilled fuel and electricity demand throughout the poor world on the other. Any effective long-term response will thus require a truly global agreement.
Such a consensus would also be essential in order to avoid highly disruptive economic effects as the countries with national consumption limits or with taxes discouraging fossil fuel combustion become less competitive or less well off than the producers and consumers in unaffected nations. Enormous difficulties facing such an agreement are best appreciated by recalling the endless rounds of the GAIT negotiations aimed at liberaliZing global trade, which, in some instances, were accompanied, in reality, by deepening trade restrictions.
Perhaps the most taxing task would be an equitable division of contributions to national control. Uniform cuts would be easier to apply in many energy-inefficient economies, which are currently the world's largest per capita offenders (Czechs at 20 t CO';capita/year, Canadians at 18 t, East Germans at 17 t, Americans at 15 t), than in the nations whose sustained energy conservation efforts have already achieved remarkably low per capita fuel consumption and hence CO, emission rates (obviously Japan, but also Sweden, France, Italy).
It is difficult to imagine how the economically wobbly Communist regimes of East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Poland or the USSR, all still heavily dependent on large-scale combustion of poor quality lignites, would be willing to adopt the same relative emission cuts as the two rich North American nations. On the other hand, if there were differentiated national targets which required the already highly efficient Japanese to do less cutting than, for example, the inefficient Canadians, Japanese competitiveness would further escalate, creating even greater trading imbalances and more unfavourable conditions for all kinds of global cooperative efforts.
The most fundamental obstacle to any substantial reduction in CO, emissions is the necessity of energizing the growing economies of the poor world. Looking just 30 years ahead, United Nations (1988) projections forecast a 15% larger population in the rich countries and 84% more people in the poor world. Current annual per capita primary energy consumption in the poor world averages about 20 MJ (the rich world's mean is close to 150 MI). Merely maintaining this inadequate rate of primary energy consumption would then boost global use by 32%; even efficiency improvements, conservation and substitutions cutting away 1/3 of today's per capita use would not reduce overall global CO, emissions.
But maintaining the poor world's annual mean of 20 MJ / capita would be just extending the existing hardship to another 3 billion people. International comparisons of a wide variety of socioeconomic indicators show that an acceptable physical quality oflife cannot be secured for populations consuming annually less than 40-50 GJ of primary energy per capita." The quest for a more decent quality of life and a more equitable division of planetary wealth should thus involve at least a doubling of the poor world's consumption mean.
Even when it is assumed that a doubling of final useful energy flows could be achieved by just a 50% increase of primary consumption (a task requiring huge capital investment for the requisite boost of conversion efficiencies), and further assumed that this major transformation would be accompanied by a 25% reduction of average per capita energy use in all rich countries, the global rate of consumption in 2020 would still come up33% higher than recent rates. Similarly, Gilland (1988) demonstrated in a detailed forecasting exercise that even stabilizing global CO, emissions roughly at the present level is not feasible if the poor world's living standards are to improve. Fundamental considerations of energy supply transitions, conservation limits and population growth make it clear that some widely publicized calls for cutting global Co, emissions by 1/3, or even by 1/2, by 2020-2025 are quite unrealistic.'
Maintaining the current rate of emissions could be bought only by continued impoverishment outside North America, Europe, Japan and Australia. Otherwise the poor world's expected population growth, coupled with just very modest increases of per capita consumption, will completely eliminate even some very large gains resulting from technical innovation, conservation and social adjustments.
Concluding Comments
An early confirmation of a clear warming signal would intensify the calls for a major global effort aimed at reducing the emissions of CO,. Such emissions are still the leading contributor to changing radiative properties of the Earth's atmosphere. However, although we have an impressive arsenal of readily available technical improvements, which will be augmented by future innovative designs, as well as a choice of helpful socioeconomic adjustments, these changes would not be sufficiently effective without recognizing the critical necessity for the earliest possible stabilization of global population.
Avoidance of rapid, undesirable and potentially risky global climatic change will possibly be the most fundamental energy problem of the early decades of the next century. If it is, dealing with it will be primarily a matter of accelerating the transition to stationary populations throughout the poor world and moderating the consuming overindulgence of rich nations. Without these two critical ingredients, even the best and speediest realistic combination of technical fixes and economic incenti ves would be inadequate to achieve the desired cuts in CO, emissions. 
